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This paper first reviews a number of stylised facts concerning OECD country
business cycles over the past four decades. In general, the amplitude of
business cycles has fallen, driven mainly by declining fluctuations of
domestic demand. As a result, international divergencies of cyclical positions
have diminished but, outside the euro area, there is little evidence of increased
synchronisation of cycles. The paper then reviews a number of influences on
business cycles. The evidence suggests that, on balance, features of
macroeconomic policies may have tended to reduce cyclical volatility and
structural changes, notably the increased share of the service sector in the
economies, have also tended to dampen the cycle. More recently, there are
signs that financial market prices have increasingly moved in sympathy
across countries, and the final section of the paper illustrates how this could
affect the international transmission of cyclical shocks and the associated
need for policy response.
* The authors are, respectively: Principal Administrator, Deputy Director and
Administrator in Policy Studies Branch, Economics Department of the OECD. They wish to
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This paper focuses on how and why the business cycle in OECD countries has
changed over the past three to four decades. Over that period, a number of
developments have changed the structure of OECD economies, spurred by
technology advances and structural reform. At the same time, most countries
have come to rely on a stability oriented setting of macroeconomic policies.
Together with increased international interdependencies and globalisation of
financial markets, some of these developments are likely to have had
a substantial influence on the nature of the domestic business cycle and may
affect the interaction of cycles across countries.
Possibly among the more important is the shift towards a more service-based
economy, which in combination with improved inventory management have
reduced the destabilising effect from stockbuilding in the business cycle –
though the role of stockbuilding in the recent US slowdown is a sobering
reminder that this element of the cycle has not been entirely eliminated.
Increased openness to trade and a surge in intra-firm and intra-industry trade
may have also contributed to changing the cycle, although the effects are not
clear-cut. Financial deepening in the private sector following deregulation of
financial markets is another important factor shaping the cycle, while the
increasing tendency for asset prices to move in line across countries is
frequently thought to strengthen synchronisation. To the extent that monetary
policies have increasingly and with greater credibility aimed at low inflation,
this is likely to affect the cyclical variation of both inflation and output, which
is also influenced by the size of fiscal stabilisers and increased focus on fiscal
consolidation in many OECD countries. Ongoing reforms and structural
changes in labour and product markets may also have affected the response of
both inflation and employment to cyclical variations in output.
Recently, there has been considerable discussion of the impact that a “New
Economy” might have on the business cycle. The recent OECD Growth Study
(OECD, 2001a) argued that in some countries, notably the United States,
information and communications technology had contributed to a rise in trend
growth but the Growth Study had little to say on the possible effects of a New
Economy on the business cycle. The slowdown in the US economy has,
however, put an end to one of the wilder claims about a New Economy: that
it would imply the end of the business cycle.
7In practice, business cycles are difficult to identify in the data, in particular to
the extent they are low-frequency phenomena. It is thus difficult to establish
clear causal links between structural changes in the economies and features of
the business cycle. There is simply not a sufficient number of observations to
test different structural relationships against each other. The present paper is
therefore constrained to follow a pragmatic and basically atheoretical
approach in identifying changes in the shape of business cycles and their
causes.
1 It is also work-in-progress in the sense that the text identifies
a number of issues that could merit further study but which have been left
unexplored at this point. Section 2 of the paper describes the methodology
used for identifying business cycle variations and presents some main stylised
facts based on that methodology. Section 3 explores some of the possible
mechanisms behind the observed changes in business cycles, while Section 4
discusses the pattern of international synchronisation. Finally, Section 5
outlines a few considerations for policy and Section 6 concludes.
8 Introduction
1 The methodology applied is, however, comparable to that used in some of the real business
cycle literature, e.g. Kydland and Prescott (1990), Backus and Kehoe (1992) and Christodoulakis
et al. (1995).2. Stylised facts about the domestic business cycle
and international synchronisation
A basic premise of this paper is that for any economy there is such a thing as
a “typical” business cycle, describing the movements around their long-term
trends of main macroeconomic variables. In practice there is no neat
separation between trend and cycle; rather, the two interact as exemplified in
the phenomenon of unemployment persistence. However, for the purpose of
this paper, a second basic premise will be that trend and cycle are indeed
separable. The crucial issue is then how to separate cyclical from trend
movements in time series data. There is a vast amount of literature and
research on this topic, offering a wide range of detrending methodologies.
2
However, no single method is able to claim global superiority, and the
preference of one methodology over another largely hinges on the specific
characteristics of the time series in question and/or the objective of the
analysis. In order to derive trend series for GDP and components of demand,
this study applies the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, which has a number of
attractions, among them its very wide usage in the business cycle literature.
The decision to use the HPfilter is not uncontroversial, however, and some of
the caveats and possible solutions are summarised in the Annex.
The data used for the current study are seasonally adjusted quarterly data
from the OECD’s Analytical Database.
3 The results are mainly based on
a subgroup of 13 OECD countries for which quarterly national accounts data
are generally available from 1960q1 to 2000q4.
4 For the purpose of filtering
the time series, data have been extended to 2006q4 and backcasted to 1955q1
in order to mitigate potential bias in both ends of the sample. These
extensions of the dataset have been constructed by replicating the growth path
9
2 Some of this literature is briefly surveyed in the Annex.
3As default, a HPfilter with λ = 1600 is used uniformly across all time series and all countries.
Gaps are calculated as 100*(log(X)–HP(log(X))), except for ratios, where the HP filter is applied
directly to the ratio. This method is standard in the literature.
4 These are the major seven OECD countries plus Australia, Austria, New Zealand, Norway,
Spain and Sweden. For Norway and New Zealand, the historical movements of the business cycle
and its components have at times been radically different from other OECD countries. In order not
to blur comparability by such distinctive idiosyncracies, these two countries have generally been
omitted from sample averages.of the previous/next 20 quarters.
5 The resulting gaps for real GDP are shown
in Figure 1. These gaps generally trace the pattern of the “standard” OECD
gap calculations, although the amplitudes of the gaps are smaller here as
growth rates of trend output are generally less smooth. Gaps have also been
calculated for the main sub-components of the expenditure accounts in order
to identify how these have influenced the overall output gap over time.
Figure 1. Output gaps 
10 Stylised facts about the domestic business cycle and international synchronisation
5 Experimentation with alternative end-point adjustments and values of λ shows that the
results presented in this paper are robust to changes in these assumptions. Specifically, the
calculations of output gap amplitudes, persistence and synchronisation have been replicated using
the OECD’s Medium Term Reference Scenario (OECD, 2001b) as the end-point adjustment as
well as for λ = 160 and λ = 16000.
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Per cent Per cent New Zealand2.1. The domestic cycle has become smaller over time...
Two main characteristics of the business cycle are its size and duration. One
approach in analysing business cycles pins down a sequence of separately
identified cycles over a given time span, for instance the post-WWII period.
The length of each cycle is then measured by number of quarters from peak
to trough and the amplitude is the maximum distance found between positive
and negative output gaps within each cycle. However, since the typical
business cycle in OECD countries spans over four to six years, there is not
a sufficient number of cycles to judge whether systematic changes have taken
place in their length or size over the past three to four decades, not to mention
the most recent years. Hence, rather than trying to identify specific cycles
across OECD countries, this paper focuses on how the output-gap has evolved
over time in each country as well as across countries.
The amplitude of the business cycle of most OECD countries, when proxied
by the average size of output gaps over ten-year periods, has declined since
the turbulent decade of the 1970s and is now in most cases lower than it was
30 years ago (Figure 2, Panel A and B).
6 In contrast with most other OECD
countries, the amplitude of the average output gap in Japan has increased
somewhat in the 1990s, implying that the average size of the output gap in
Japan over the most recent decade is around 50 per cent higher than that of
the United States and one-third higher than that of the euro area. Increases in
the size of the output gaps also occurred in Spain and Sweden in the 1990s,
but on a more moderate scale.
7
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6 The average size of the business cycle for each country is calculated using both the standard
deviation of the gap within each ten-year overlapping period, as well as the average absolute
(numerical) size of the gap. The two methods yield similar results, which are also confirmed by
a third measure of the business cycle amplitude, the root mean square (RMS) of output gaps. This
is indeed what one would expect looking over the whole sample, since the average gap is zero by
definition. However, for sub-periods of the sample, differences between the different measures
may arise.
7 See Figure A1 of the Annex.Figure 2. The amplitude of output gaps has diminished
Panel A. Standard deviation of output gaps
Panel B. Average absolute size of output gaps
Note: The gap is calculated using an HP1600 filter. Country specific output gap profiles for moving
10-year averages are shown in figure A1 of the Annex. 
1. Simple average of Germany, France, Italy, Austria and Spain.
2. Simple average of the United Kingdon, Canada, Australia and Sweden.
The overall decreasing amplitude of output gaps in OECD countries is mainly
related to higher stability of domestic demand, despite some slight increase in
the variability of domestic demand in Japan and the euro area in the
1990s (Table 1). For most countries, the contribution to economic fluctuations
from government consumption and investment is quite small and stable over
time. This implies that the thrust of the decrease in volatility stems from
a reduction of the cyclicality of private investment and, in particular, private
consumption.
8 Stockbuilding also contributes much less to the cycle than it
used to do, cf. Section 3 below. The contribution from trade to output gap
Stylised facts about the domestic business cycle and international synchronisation 13
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8 See Figure A2 of the Annex.variance has been negative for most countries and in most periods – in other
words, trade has generally, and often in a substantial way, acted to dampen the
cycle in OECD countries.
9 However, the extent to which this offsetting effect
from trade on the cycle in domestic demand has increased or decreased over
time varies considerably across countries, as discussed in more detail in
Section 3 below.
Table 1. Contributions to the variance of output gaps
Country and period Total output  Contribution from  Contribution Residual
gap variance total domestic demand from trade
(1)=(2)+(3)+(4) (2) (3) (4)
United States
1961-1970 1.8 2.1 -0.2 -0.0
1971-1980 4.6 6.7 -1.6 -0.5
1981-1990 3.1 4.2 -1.0 -0.1
1991-2000 0.7 1.3 -0.6 0.0
Japan
1961-1970 2.9 2.7 -0.4 0.5
1971-1980 3.3 5.2 -1.8 -0.1
1981-1990 1.1 1.5 -0.3 -0.0
1991-2000 1.8 2.2 -0.4 -0.0
Euro countries
1
1961-1970 2.1 3.1 -0.9 -0.1
1971-1980 2.8 4.5 -1.7 0.0
1981-1990 0.9 1.5 -0.6 0.0
1991-2000 1.0 2.0 -1.0 0.0
Other countries
2
1961-1970 1.9 2.5 -0.7 0.1
1971-1980 2.8 3.9 -1.3 0.2
1981-1990 2.8 4.7 -2.3 0.4
1991-2000 1.7 2.2 -0.5 0.0
Note: The variance of the output gaps is a proxy for the average size of the gap (since it measures the
squared average distance from the gap mean, which is close to zero). The contributions to total
output gap variance from the total domestic demand gap and the trade gap are calculated as
a weighted average of their individual variances and their covariance. The residual is the
discrepancy between the total output variance and the sum of its components, which is due to
statistical discrepancies, averaging effects as well as the non-additivity of real expenditure
components for countries using chain-weighted accounts. See Table A1 of the Annex for more
detail.
1. Euro countries in the sample include Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Simple average.
2. Other countries include Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Australia, New Zealand and
Norway are not included due to lack of data). Simple average.
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9 The only exception is Austria in the 1990s, where trade contributed slightly to increased
output gap variance, and Germany in the 1980s and 1990s, where trade on net did not affect total
output gap variance (cf. Table A1 of the Annex).2.2. ...whereas the duration of the cycle has remained almost unchanged
in the three major regions
The duration of the cycle is another pertinent feature of the business cycle. As
was the case for measuring amplitudes, the lack of a sufficient number of
cycles excludes systematic analysis of recent changes to the length of the
cycle, measured in quarters. Instead, changes in the duration of the cycle are
gauged from changes in the persistence of output gaps.
10 Hence, based on
changes to the first order auto-correlation of output gaps, the degree of
persistence of the business cycle appears to have been more or less unchanged
for the three major regions over the sample period, albeit with a slightly
declining tendency for Japan most recently (Figure 3). For the euro area, the
relative stability of the persistence over time disguises that persistence, while
remaining almost unchanged in Italy and Spain, has increased in Austria and
France and decreased slightly in Germany.
11 For other countries (Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom) there is
a relatively clear tendency for the previously short duration of the cycle to
converge towards the same duration as elsewhere.
Figure 3. The persistence of output gaps is mostly stable
Note: The persistence of the gaps is measured by the first order autocorrelation of the gap. An AR(1)
process is fitted to a moving 10-year window.
1. Simple average of Germany, France, Italy, Austria and Spain.
2. Simple average of the United Kingdon, Canada, Australia and Sweden.        
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10 The measure of business cycle duration used here – persistence of the output gaps measured
by their first order autocorrelations – is akin to the concept used in a number of other business
cycle studies (see e.g. Christodoulakis  et al., 1995, or Barro 1988 in an examination of
unemployment persistence). By focusing only on the first-order autocorrelation, no specific
assumptions about the dynamic process driving the output-gap are required (other than it contains
an autoregressive element, which is clearly the case). See also Greene (1997), page 834.
11 See Figure A3 of the Annex.2.3. International divergencies have diminished but synchronisation has
not increased
Greater economic integration among a group of countries might be expected
to lead to more similar cycles with respect to intensity, duration and timing.
The degree of synchronisation has implications for the appropriate policy
response to cyclical developments, given that the domestic cycle may be
either amplified or mitigated by impulses coming from abroad. This issue is
of particular interest for the euro-area countries, where large cyclical
divergencies among countries would be difficult to meet with a common
monetary response by the ECB and might instead call for domestic counter-
cyclical policies.
One measure of the degree of business cycle divergence across countries is
the standard deviation of output gaps across countries. This would be zero
across all time periods if the business cycle had the same periodicity and
amplitude in all countries. Hence, the closer to zero the standard deviation,
the less divergent are the cycles. In this sense, cycles indeed seem to have
become gradually less divergent over time, most clearly since the early
1990s (Figure 4).
12 However, the reduction in the cross-country dispersion of
gaps seems to be related mainly to the fact that output gaps on average have
become smaller over time, rather than being the result of business cycles
becoming increasingly in phase across countries. At least, a number of
potential indicators of business cycle synchronisation did not point to clear
trends,
13 except possibly a closer alignment of euro-area business cycles.
14
16 Stylised facts about the domestic business cycle and international synchronisation
12 This result is robust to a number of variations in the detrending methodology (using other
values for λ in the HP filter as well as using OECD’s standard definition of the output gap, cf.
Giorno et al., 1995). It should also be stressed that the omission of Norway and New Zealand from
the sample does not have any effect on the conclusion – in fact, including these two countries
would only reinforce the tendency for increased synchronisation over time.
13 Bilateral correlation coefficients of output gaps were averaged across country pairs. The
standard deviation of output gaps was corrected by a moving average of the output gaps. As well,
the ratio between the absolute sum of output gaps and the sum of absolute gaps was considered.
In neither case could clear trends be identified, except possibly among euro-area countries.
14 This is also found in a number of other studies, such as Christodoulakis et al. (1995) and
Wynne and Koo (2000). However, as noted by the latter: “There is a much higher degree of
correlation between economic activity in the original six members of the EU than among any
countries that joined later. There are some exceptions to this for countries that are geographically
proximate”.Figure 4. Reduced divergencies of output gaps 
(Cross-country standard deviation of gaps)
Note: The degree of synchronisation is measured by the standard deviation of the gap across 11 OECD
countries in each period of time.
The thick line shows the 12 quarter moving average. The gap is calculated using an HP1600 filter.  
Stylised facts about the domestic business cycle and international synchronisation 17













% point % point3. Factors shaping the business cycle
While the 1960s were characterised by steady expansion and relative
macroeconomic stability, the 1970s became a much more volatile decade in
most OECD countries due to a mix of domestic policy failures and
international disturbances, notably the two oil crises. The shift in monetary
policy regimes that occurred around 1980 in many OECD countries has
presumably been a major factor behind the tendency for smaller output gaps,
but other influences may have been important as well. These include the shift
towards a more service-based economy, the increasing role of the public
sector and better management of inventories. On the other hand,
developments such as deregulation and increased globalisation of financial
markets as well as financial deepening in the private sector have had
conflicting effects on the cycle with the net impact being unclear. “New
Economy” effects are also likely to impinge on the business cycle
characteristics, but again the effects are uncertain. These and other factors are
discussed in more detail below. Ongoing structural changes in other areas –
such as labour-market reform, strengthening of competition policies and
privatisation and deregulation of network industries in many OECD countries
– have undoubtedly also exerted some influence on the business cycle.
Exploring such effects, however, is outside the scope of this paper.
3.1. Shifts in economic structure and technological change
Changes in the composition of GDP over time are likely to have reduced
output cyclicality
The role of stockbuilding in shaping the business cycle has traditionally
attracted much attention among business cycle analysts. This is due, first, to
stockbuilding historically having had a strong influence on the cycle, despite
being a very small share of total GDP.
15 Second, stockbuilding is highly
procyclical and hence a destabilising element in the cycle, in contrast to the
predictions of traditional theoretical production smoothing models. While the
second issue has been more or less resolved by theoretical developments over
19
15 Dornbusch and Fischer (1987) found that declines in stockbuilding accounted for
approximately half of the total decline in the output gap on average during recessions in the United
States since 1948, even though stockbuilding amounted to around 1 per cent of GDP on average.the past couple of decades,
16 the question remains whether stockbuilding is as
important for the business cycle today as it was in the past. One observation
is that the share of stockbuilding in total GDP has been drastically reduced
over the past three decades (Figure 5).
17 The declining share of stockbuilding
in overall GDP is caused, inter alia, by the increasing share of the service
sector in OECD countries (private as well as public services).
18 Improved
inventory control and increased use of just-in-time production in
manufacturing have also contributed, facilitated by increased use of
information technology. This reduced share of stockbuilding in GDP leaves
less room for inventory cycles to dominate output fluctuations to the same
extent as in the past. In principle, such a trend could have been offset by
increased procyclicality of stockbuilding but there is no strong evidence of
such a tendency except, perhaps, in the United States and the euro area over
the 1990s (Figure 6). In combination, these factors imply that stockbuilding
cycles have become much less important for the overall business cycle except
in the case of Japan (Figure 7).
20 Factors shaping the business cycle
16 While recognising the importance of production smoothing (if demand varies over time,
increasing marginal costs of production provides an incentive to smooth production), recent
theoretical models illustrate how other motives may be even more important for the firm and
hence lead to the opposite outcome (i.e. that the variance of production exceeds the variance of
sales). One of these is the motive for firms to bunch production in order to avoid stock-outs, and
hence lost sales, when production decisions must be made before demand is fully known
(Blanchard and Fischer, 1989). Another model (Blinder, 1986), suggests that production
smoothing actually takes place for truly unexpected changes in sales, but that a combination of
small cost shocks and strong autocorrelation of demand shocks is sufficient to generate overall
procyclicality of stockbuilding.
17 As illustrated in Figure A2 of the Annex, the size of the inventory gap has also been
significantly reduced in the past decades.
18 The share of services in total GDP increased from 56 per cent in 1970 to 70 per cent in 1999
for a weighted average of 13 OECD countries (the same sample as used throughout this study).Figure 5. Declining importance of stockbuilding in GDP
(Stockbuilding as a share of GDP, moving average)
Note: The figure show the average absolute size of stockbuilding in per cent of GDP (10-year moving
windows). The ratio of nominal stockbuilding  to nominal GDP is shown rather than real shares
since these may be flawed for countries using chain-weighted GDP measures, such as the United
States. If changes in deflators do not differ too much, the trend in the nominal ratio is a good
approximation of the trend in the contribution from stockbuilding to real GDP.
1. Simple average of Germany, France, Italy, Austria and Spain.
2. Simple average of the United Kingdon, Canada, Australia and Sweden.
Figure 6. Stockbuilding: more or less procyclical?
(Correlation between stockbuilding and output gaps)
Note: The figure shows the contemporaneous correlation coefficients between output gaps and
stockbuilding gaps (defined as (stockbuilding/GDP) - HP(stockbuilding/GDP)) calculated over
10-year windows.
1. Simple average of Germany, France, Italy, Austria and Spain.
2. Simple average of the United Kingdon, Canada, Australia and Sweden.
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End-year of 10-year window
United States Japan Euro area(1) Other countries(2)Figure 7. Stockbuilding has become less of a destabiliser
(Contribution from stockbuilding to variance of domestic demand) 
Note: The figure shows the contribution from stockbuilding to the variance in total domestic demand.
The contribution from stockbuilding has been calculated as the residual between the contributions
from final and total domestic demand. 
1. Simple average of Germany, France, Italy, Austria and Spain.
2. Simple average of the United Kingdon, Canada and Sweden.
In contrast to stockbuilding, trade acts to stabilise output, as shown in Table
1 above. This stabilisation is the net result of two opposing effects: a positive
contribution to output-gap volatility from the volatility in the trade variables
themselves, and a cushioning effect from the covariance between domestic
demand and imports (and, in principle though less important, exports). Apart
from Japan, both effects have become more important over time relative to
the total output-gap variance (Figure 8), reflecting the net effect of
substantially increased trade shares in GDP on the one hand and lower
variance of trade gaps on the other.
19
From a business cycle perspective, the most interesting question is perhaps
whether trade has become more or less important over time in cushioning
fluctuations in domestic demand. This can be gauged by the change over time
in the net impact from trade on overall output-gap variance. As mentioned
above, this differs substantially across countries. For the United States as well
as the average euro-area country, trade has to an increasing extent acted to
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United States Japan Euro area(1) Other countries(2)
19 The contribution from trade to overall output gap variance consists of the weighted variances
of the export gap and the import gap minus the covariances between the export and import gaps and
the total domestic demand gap. The isolated contribution from the variances of the export and
import gaps has increased as both variables have become larger as a share of total output. This is
only partly offset by the variance of both gaps having declined over time, in line with the tendency
for the overall output gap (Figure A2 of the Annex). Japan differs from most other countries by
displaying a slightly increasing amplitude of import gaps over the past two decades.stabilise output over the past four decades (Figure 9). The euro-area average,
however, disguises major differences across countries: trade is now less of
a stabiliser for Austria and Germany than it was 20–30 years ago, while for
Italy and Spain the stabilisation effect have increased substantially.
20 The
Figure 8. Trade has gained in importance
(Contribution to output gap variance) 
Note: The figure shows the relative contributions to overall variance in the output gap from, respectively,
gross trade (i.e. export and import gaps) and  the covariance of trade and domestic demand.
Country specific details are given in table A1 of the Annex.
1. Simple average of Germany, France, Italy, Austria and Spain. 
2. Simple average of the United Kingdon, Canada and Sweden.                
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20 See Table A1 of the Annex.effect for France is almost unchanged over the past three decades. For Japan,
there is a tendency for trade to become less stabilising over time. Recently,
this has also been the case for Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Figure 9. Cushioning from trade has increased in some regions
(Output gap variance relative to domestic demand variance)
Note: The figure shows the variance of output gaps relative to that of total domestic demand gaps. It
indicates the net cushioning effect from trade on overall output gap variance, i.e. the more distant
from 100, the more cushioning. Country specific details are given in table A1 of the Annex.
1. Simple average of Germany, France, Italy, Austria and Spain.
2. Simple average of the United Kingdon, Canada and Sweden.   
Ambiguous effects from the New Economy
Whereas the previous sub-section dealt with trends over the past four decades,
the influence of the New Economy on the business cycle is a current and/or
prospective development and, hence, less amenable to statistical analysis than
to armchair reasoning. The term “New Economy” is not well defined but
captures among other things the effect that production and use of Information
and Communications Technology (ICT) has on the economy. So far, most
interest has focused on the role of ICT for trend growth where the evidence,
in spite of the current slowdown, points to considerable positive effects for
the United States but much more limited effects elsewhere (Box 1). Even so,
ICT is also likely to affect the shape of cyclical fluctuations. Two effects may
be worth distinguishing: the cyclical developments associated with an
increasing role for ICT and rising trend growth, and the effects of ICT use on
the “steady-state business cycle”.
24 Factors shaping the business cycle
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United States Japan Euro area(1) Other countries(2)Box 1. ICT and recent trends in economic growth
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As part of its Growth Project (OECD, 2001a), the OECD has assembled evidence on
the role of ICT for trend economic growth (see Bassanini et al., 2000 and Schreyer,
2000). Basically, three channels have been identified in the literature for ICT to boost
trend growth:
–T echnical progress in the ICT producing sector is sufficiently fast for productivity
growth in that sector to affect aggregate productivity growth.
– The associated rapid fall in prices of ICT goods gives an incentive for ICT using
enterprises to substitute labour by ICT equipment, hence raising labour productivity
growth in the ICT using part of the economy.
– The capacity of ICT to generate network effects, restructuring of enterprises and
markets etc. raises total factor productivity among users of ICT.
Estimates of the quantitative importance of these channels differ between different
sources reflecting different methodologies. However, with all due caution about the
uncertainty of the numbers, the split between trend and cycle and the differences across
studies, the broad orders of magnitude are as follows. US trend labour productivity, and
hence trend output, accelerated by about 1 percentage point per year between the two
halves of the 1990s. Approximately half of this was due to substitution of ICT capital
for labour with the other two effects amounting to about a quarter each.
Europe has not so far experienced any parallel acceleration in labour productivity.
However, to some extent this reflects other factors operating in the opposite direction,
such as a slowdown in the capital-for-labour substitution related to real wage
moderation and the crowding-in of low-wage/low-productivity workers as a result of
a decline in their relative labour costs (caused by payroll tax rebates etc.). Even so,
attempts to calculate the contribution from ICT capital to trend growth using
a consistent methodology indicate that it has remained much lower than in the United
States – at less than half a point against almost a full percentage point in the United
States in the second half of the 1990s – and shown much less of a tendency to
accelerate (Figure 10). Nevertheless, this does not exclude that over the medium term
Europe may experience an acceleration in labour productivity related to ICT (OECD,
2001b).
Figure 10. ICT capital has boosted trend growth
(Contribution of ICT capital to average annual GDP growth)
Note: ICT includes both hardware and software.














1990-1995 1995-1999As for the effects of moving into a New Economy, the US experience may be
relevant to other countries insofar as they may emulate US developments.
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A major macroeconomic issue in this transition phase has been whether the
demand-side effects were outpacing the supply effects, i.e. pushing towards
a positive output gap. The argument is that higher trend growth will imply
higher growth in profits which, in turn, will be reflected in share prices
(unless the discount rate shifts up correspondingly, as might be expected
based on theory). The rise in US trend growth between the first and the second
half of the 1990s might on this assumption lead to an increase in share prices
by about a third. With equity market capitalisation corresponding broadly to
GDP and a marginal propensity to consume out of equity wealth of about
5 per cent (see Boone et al., 1998), the short-term impulse of a sudden, well
understood shift to this higher growth rate might be of the order of 1-2 per
cent of GDP. In practice, however, shifts in trend growth are neither sudden
nor immediately understood. This may, on the one hand, imply that the effect
is more spread out over time but, on the other hand, also implies that
mistakenly optimistic growth expectations can lead to excessive share price
reactions, as seemed to be the case in the United States.
An offsetting effect on consumption may arise to the extent higher output and
income growth is slow to feed into household perceptions of permanent
income, tending to boost the saving rate. There may also be an off-setting
cyclical effect coming from labour markets. Meyer (2000) argues that
because real wage aspirations are slow to catch up with higher trend
productivity growth, the NAIRU may temporarily have dropped by as much
as a full percentage point in the United States.
22 Richardson et al. (2000), on
the other hand, were not able to identify temporary effects of variations in
productivity growth on the NAIRU in a study covering most OECD countries.
The bottom line is that the cyclical impulse of a shift to higher trend growth
is uncertain and importantly hinges on the extent to which the stock market
overshoots and the reaction of the private sector to such excessive increases
in equity prices. For major continental European countries, stock market
capitalisation and marginal propensities to consume out of stock market
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21 There are doubts, related inter alia to different structural policy settings, as to whether other
countries may be able to fully emulate the remarkable US recovery in productivity growth (see
Bassanini et al., 2000 and Elmeskov and Scarpetta, 2000).
22 The implication of the results by Manning (1992) across a number of countries and Akerlof
et al. (1996) for the United States is also that higher productivity growth will reduce the NAIRU
though the effect will be permanent.wealth are lower than for the United States, suggesting that the wealth-
spending effect may be much more subdued should any significant New
Economy effects on European growth materialise.
Moving to the effects on the business cycle of a greater role for ICT in the
economy, a number of more or less fanciful effects may be conceived but are
outside the scope of this paper.
23 A more mundane effect relates to the greater
ability to control inventories and the tendency for lower inventories which
was discussed above. Another influence relates to the short-lived nature of
many ICT goods. There are two effects on domestic demand here. First,
a high depreciation rate will, ceteris paribus, tend to raise the gross
investment rate, hence increasing the weight in GDP of notoriously volatile
investment.
24 Second, the volatility of investment may be reduced to the
extent more rapid depreciation implies a more rapid return of investment to
equilibrium following a shock.
This latter effect is illustrated by means of the OECD
Secretariat’s INTERLINK model in Figure 11. An autonomous negative
demand shock is run on the sub-model for the United States on two different
assumptions concerning the depreciation rate. One simulation is based on the
current high depreciation rate whereas the other, parallel, simulation is run
with a depreciation that is only half, i.e. corresponding to the depreciation rate
of a decade ago. The results show a moderate, but non-negligible, short-term
cushioning effect from higher scrapping rates: in the first and second year
following the shock, the effect on real GDP is dampened by 10-15 per cent
with the new, higher scrapping rates (Figure 11). After the second year, the
difference between real GDP adjustment in the two cases becomes
insignificant.
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23 ICT will affect the economy in many subtle ways that will end up having profound effects
including on the business cycle. For example, lower communication costs and easier access to
information is likely to strengthen the trend towards globalisation. Likewise, to the extent ICT
affects menu costs or price transparency of markets, inflation dynamics may be affected.
24 With capital-output ratios typically in the 2–3 range, a rise in the average depreciation rate
by 2–3 percentage points would increase the investment share in GDP by 4–9 percentage points,
ceteris paribus, corresponding to between less than a fifth and almost a half.Figure 11. Higher scrapping rates cushion demand shocks
Note: Adjustment of real GDPto a private consumption shock of 1 per cent of GDPfor various scrapping
rates. Deviations from baseline, simulation with the US sub-model of OECD’s Interlink model.
The old scrapping rate is around 5 per cent per year, the new scrapping rate is about 10 per cent
per year. 
An important trade aspect of the current cyclical downturn is also related to
ICT goods and their high depreciation rate. Given rapid technological
progress, computers and semiconductors have an almost perishable nature
which, especially in the case of semi-conductors, in combination with their
low marginal but high fixed costs of production, implies that reductions in
high-technology spending may lead to aggressive price cuts by producers. In
the current downturn, this behaviour has led to substantial terms-of-trade
losses for countries that are large exporters of these goods (OECD, 2001b).
More generally, the semiconductor industry seems to be prone to hog-cycle
type adjustment and where it has become large, can increase the cyclical
volatility of economies.
Another characteristic of the ICT industry seems to be vertical supply
linkages across borders, emphasising the increasing link between trade cycles
and domestic cycles. In the current conjuncture, US export weakness has thus
partly been caused by weakness of domestic demand channelled via foreign
imports. Although the development of vertical supply linkages is not limited
to the ICT sector, the use of ICT often facilitates such developments in other
industries.
















Per cent of GDP Per cent of GDP
Current, high scrapping rate Old, low scrapping rate3.2. Financial deregulation and liberalisation
Along with structural changes and technological advances, another potent
factor affecting the nature of the business cycle is deregulation and
liberalisation of financial markets. As for the “New Economy”, these changes
are likely to have transitory as well as permanent effects on the business
cycle. For many OECD countries, which undertook financial deregulation
and opened their markets in the 1980s and the early 1990s, the initial impact
turned out to be a painful experience as deregulation triggered an overly
strong cycle in savings and investment. In retrospect, a number of factors may
have contributed to these adverse developments. The sequencing of reform
was in some cases mismanaged as financial liberalisation preceded the
establishment of adequate regulatory frameworks, including strengthened
supervision and capital adequacy rules, as well as the correction of strong
incentives to borrow embedded in tax systems. Adding to this, the internal
risk management among financial institutions turned out to be deficient in
many cases, which, sometimes in combination with moral hazard incentives
created by implicit or explicit government bailout guarantees, led to instances
of excessive risk taking in the early phases following liberalisation. Finally,
the timing of deregulation was not always well chosen given the cyclical
positions of the economies involved and the overall macro-policy stance.
Looking ahead, the more interesting question is how financial deregulation
might permanently affect the nature of the business cycle. On the one hand,
easier and cheaper access to credit implies that income and liquidity
constraints are loosened, likely exerting a stabilising influence on private
consumption and investment. On the other hand, deregulation may also lead
to greater instability insofar as it amplifies the role of the financial accelerator
(Box 2) and the risk of excessive asset-price and credit cycles. In line with the
mechanisms driving the financial accelerator, developments in credit and
asset prices are typically procyclical (Figure 12) and often mutually
reinforcing (BIS, 2001). However, evidence that asset prices have become
more procyclical following deregulation is scarce, although there seem to be
plenty of anecdotes pointing in this direction.
Factors shaping the business cycle 29Figure  12. Cyclicality of credit and asset prices
Sources : BIS; OECD.
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CanadaBox 2. The financial accelerator
In any case, there are other valid reasons to believe that the financial
accelerator may now play a larger role in shaping the cycle. First, saving
imbalances in the private sector can potentially be financed on a larger scale
and sustained over a longer period compared to when markets were regulated.
A second (and related) factor is that domestic imbalances may now more
easily be financed through substantial cross-border capital flows. Third, and
perhaps most important, financial liberalisation has spurred a significant
financial deepening of private sector balance sheets, including a marked
increase in corporate debt levels and larger household holdings of market-
linked financial assets (Figure 13). The larger financial exposure of
households has increased the sensitivity of domestic demand to changes in
asset prices – since wealth effects are now much larger as a share of income,
and because financial wealth is more firmly linked to asset prices. Likewise,
enterprise balance sheets, and thereby their capacity to borrow, has become
more dependent on asset prices.
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The financial accelerator describes the process whereby improved earning prospects of
both firms and households during a cyclical upturn triggers both increased asset prices
and easier availability of credit. Increased asset prices improve the value of collateral,
which in turn stimulates further credit expansion. Faster growth and additional
borrowing can then feed back into higher asset prices. Hence, there is a tendency for
asset prices and credit to spiral up during an upswing (and vice versa during
a downturn).
The financial accelerator is associated with information asymmetries between lenders
and borrowers. Since borrowers tend to have more information on their project than
lenders, it can be difficult to finance a profitable project when economic situations are
unfavourable and collateral values are low. When the cycle reverses, better economic
conditions and the related improvement of collateral values will enable such projects
to find access to external financing sources.
Another factor influencing the strength of the financial accelerator is the potential
additional cyclicality of credit caused by cyclical biases in risk assessment. This leads
to risks being underestimated in booms and overestimated in slumps, hence
exacerbating the business cycle. An indication of the risk assessment bias is that high-
yield bond spreads over AAA-rated corporate bonds tend to rise sharply during
recessions, reflecting increased risk premia and tightened credit conditions for external
financing and vice versa during upswings (Borio et al., 2001).Figure  13. Financial deepening in the private sector
Panel A. Household financial assets
(in per cent of household disposable income)
Sources: see Table 57, OECD Economic Outlook, June 2001.
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(in per cent of GDP)
1. Comprises only enterprises in former West Germany.
Sources shown at the end of document.
The impact of financial deregulation on the business cycle may also depend
on the financial structure – i.e. whether the financial system is based primarily
on credit institutions or securities markets. This may be particularly the case
insofar as differences exist between the two systems in the effectiveness of
monetary and supervisory policies to contain the financial accelerator. For
instance, it could be argued that monetary policy is more effective in
containing credit expansion in a system dominated by bank lending and
where capital market imperfections prevent some firms from finding
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1980 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 2000alternative sources of financing. The reason is that monetary authorities in
such systems have direct control over the liquidity supplied to banks, whereas
credit demand and supply in capital markets can only be influenced indirectly
via the interest rate channel (Cecchetti and Krause, 2001).
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The real economy impact of deregulated financial markets is most directly
felt on private investment and consumption. While private investment has
become more volatile relative to output over the past 10-20 years in many
OECD countries (Figure 14, Panel A), this does not necessarily point to
financial deregulation as having had a destabilising influence; the increased
volatility relative to output might just as well be rooted elsewhere, such as
adjustment to new technologies, and increased stability of other components
of demand. Another finding is that the contemporaneous correlation between
the private sector investment gap and the output gap has decreased slightly in
the 1990s in many countries (Figure 15, Panel A). It is too soon, however, to
judge whether this is a permanent phenomenon and to what extent it is related
to financial deregulation – i.e. if a more lasting decoupling of current earnings
and investment projects has occurred due to better access to credit and long-
term financing. Unlike investment, private consumption has generally not
become more volatile relative to output, the volatility of both having declined
in line (Figure 14, Panel B) and there is not much evidence of any systematic
tendency for less correlation between consumption gaps and output gaps in
most recent years (Figure 15, Panel B).
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25 It may also be added that financial deregulation by itself could have an impact on the
financial structure.Figure 14. Increasing relative volatility of private investment
Panel A. Standard deviation of private investment gaps relative to output gaps 
Panel B. Standard deviation of private consumption gaps relative to output gaps
Note: Gap calculated using HP1600 filter.
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1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000Figure 15. Correlation of private investment and consumption gaps 
with the output gap
Panel A. Correlation between private investment gaps and output gaps
Panel B. Correlation between private consumption gaps and output gaps
Note: Contemporaneous correlation coefficients between gaps, mowing 10-year windows. Gaps are
calculated using an HP1600 filter.
1. Simple average of Germany, France, Italy, Austria and Spain.
2. Simple average of the United Kingdon, Canada, Australia and Sweden.
3.3. Macroeconomic policy
The shift towards an economic environment of low and stable inflation, once
it was accomplished, has almost certainly contributed to damping business
cycles. Insofar as private sector inflation expectations have become more
detached from cyclical developments, there is a reduced risk of having
excessive price and wage increases triggering an abrupt slowdown following
a cyclical peak.
26 At the same time, there is a concern that an environment
36 Factors shaping the business cycle
26 The downturn may be caused by a mix of factors such as monetary or fiscal tightening,
increased risk premia on long-term interest rates or loss of competitiveness for countries following
a fixed exchange rate policy.















United States Japan Euro area(1) Other countries(2)















United States Japan Euro area(1) Other countries(2)combining low current inflation with strong central bank credibility may
contribute to over-optimism in financial markets during a cyclical upswing,
thus fuelling credit booms and unsustainable increases in asset prices, leading
to prolonged misalignments of private sector balances.
27 On balance,
however, the low inflation environment is likely to have contributed to
smaller cycles.
28
It is difficult to measure accurately the change in inflation expectations, but
in the context of this exercise, an indication may be had from the variability
of inflation relative to that of the output gap. A reduction in this ratio is
consistent with a firmer anchoring of inflation expectations.
29 Indeed, such
a development seems to have taken place in most OECD countries over the
past 20 years, except for Germany and the United States, where the ratio has
been relatively constant, and Italy and Norway, where it has increased
(Figure 16).
30
As regards fiscal policy, a distinction must be made between automatic
stabilisation and discretionary fiscal changes. Automatic stabilisers, by
definition, exert a damping effect on the cycle, and countries with large
stabilisers will experience smaller fluctuations, ceteris paribus.
31 Simulations
using the OECD Secretariat’s INTERLINK model suggest that over the
1990s, automatic fiscal stabilisers have worked to dampen cyclical
fluctuations in the average OECD country by about 25 per cent, covering,
however, a considerable cross-country variation (Van den Noord, 2000).
Since taxes and government transfers have increased significantly as a share
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27 Such factors may for instance have played a non-negligible role in the United States during
the late 1990s as, in the absence of inflation build-ups, the economy was able to sustain high
investment and growth rates over a long period without credit and financial conditions becoming
unstable.
28 It has been argued that central banks have succeeded not only in stabilising inflation (and
hence, indirectly, output), but have managed to become more effective in stabilising both inflation
and output at the same time due, not least, to a combination of more central bank independence
and changes in the monetary transmission mechanism as government ownership of banks has
diminished and deposit insurance schemes have become more widespread (Cecchetti and Krause,
2001).
29 This can be seen relatively easily, cf. the Annex.
30 It should be noted, however, that the absolute variability of inflation has decreased
significantly in all countries in the sample, except for Norway. In the case of Italy, the decline in
trend inflation was particularly pronounced over the 1990s and tended to boost the standard
deviation of inflation.
31 Of course, this may be achieved at the cost of efficiency losses to the extent large stabilisers
reflect highly distortive taxes and/or government expenditure.Figure 16. Inflation expectations have become better anchored
(Relative standard deviations of inflation and output gaps)
Note: The figure shows the standard deviation of inflation relative to the standard deviation of the output
gap (moving 10-year windows). Gaps are calculated using an HP1600 filter.  
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Spain Sweden Norway New Zealandof total income in most OECD countries over the past 40 years, the
dampening effect from fiscal stabilisers is likely to have become stronger.
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Unfortunately, there is no evidence readily available about changes over time
in the magnitude of automatic fiscal stabilisation.
For well-known reasons, discretionary fiscal stabilisation is prone to the risk
of aggravating rather than counteracting an initial disturbance. Moreover, the
political economy aspects involved in discretionary fiscal policy changes may
imply that these are inefficient in terms of stabilisation. The outcome may be
a sub-optimal policy mix insofar as monetary policy has to react to correct
adverse cyclical implications of fiscal policy actions. However, the overall
fiscal prudence prevailing in most OECD countries over the past decade or
two has contributed not only to a substantial improvement in the macro-
policy mix but also seems to have reduced the occurrence of macro-policy
failures caused by badly timed fiscal policy changes. Based on correlations
between fiscal stance and the output gap, there are indications – although very
rough – that from a cyclical point of view, the timing of discretionary fiscal
policy changes in the OECD area has slightly improved over the
1990s (Table 2).
33
In conclusion, the combined effects from automatic stabilisation and
discretionary fiscal policy seem increasingly to have contributed to dampen
the cycle in most OECD countries. This is partly because automatic stabilisers
have become stronger, partly because of better timing of discretionary fiscal
policy changes in many countries throughout the 1990s. While the former
effect may be permanent, insofar as the policies that increased fiscal
stabilisers remain in place, the future of the latter effect remains more
uncertain.
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32 Taxes in per cent of GDP have increased by almost 12 percentage points for the average
OECD country since 1965 (from around 25 per cent to 37–38 per cent). Government transfers
have on average doubled over the same period (from around 8 per cent of GDPin the mid-1960s to
around 16 per cent today). However, there is not necessarily a simple, linear relationship between
the size of taxes and government transfers and the size of fiscal stabilisation. The stabilisation
effect depends, among other things, on the degree of progressivity in the tax and transfer system
as well as the composition of taxes on income-, consumption- and property taxes.
33Van den Noord (2000) likewise finds that a number of countries – including Australia, Japan,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States and several smaller EU countries –















United States 0.49 0.41
Number of countries applying  6 9
counter-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy
Number of countries applying procyclical  8 5
discretionary fiscal policy
Note: The 14 countries included in the table are those OECD countries for which cyclically adjusted
primary balances are available back to 1975. Counter-cyclical policies are identified where the
contemporaneous correlation between output gaps and the fiscal stance is positive over the sub-
period in question. Procyclical policies are identified where the correlation between output gaps
and the fiscal stance is negative over the sub-period in question. Coefficients in bold are significant
at the 10 per cent level of the 2-sided t-statistic. The fiscal stance measures the yearly change in
the cyclically adjusted primary balance in per cent of potential output. The derivation of the
cyclically adjusted primary balance is outlined in Van den Noord (2000). The fiscal stance is only
indicative for discretionary fiscal policy changes as it is also affected by changes in potential
output and other effects on the budget not related to fiscal policies (changes in revenues from
natural resources, etc.). The results should hence be interpreted with caution.
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The tendency for reduced cross-country divergence of output gaps among
OECD countries, as noted in Section 2, seems mainly to reflect the reduced
size of the cycle observed for individual countries rather than business cycles
having become more synchronised across countries. Against that background,
this section discusses the role of different demand components in generating
international divergencies. It then goes on to consider various channels for
transmitting cyclical impulses from one country to another which in the future
may increase cross-country synchronisation.
To identify the sources of reduced cross-country divergencies in output gaps,
it may be worth considering the divergencies of different demand components
(Figure 17). Like for GDP, the movements over time are somewhat irregular
and period averages are therefore considered. Not surprisingly, the degree of
divergence is higher for domestic demand than for GDP as reflected in
a higher level of the standard deviation. Trade clearly acts as a cushion. The
change in divergencies over time is virtually identical between GDP and
domestic demand. That is, the contribution from trade to bring countries’
positions closer together has not risen over time, despite increases in openness
as measured by trade shares in GDP.
34 This could reflect that reduced
divergence of domestic demand has tended to reduce the divergence of
imports.
The two main factors accounting for the reduced divergencies in domestic
demand are stockbuilding and private consumption. In contrast to total
domestic demand, the level of divergencies of final domestic demand is about
equal to that of GDP. Stockbuilding hence contributes to increased cross-
country divergence of GDP. However, this effect has diminished substantially
since the 1970s and has become very moderate in recent years. This trend is
hardly surprising given the diminished role of stockbuilding in driving cycles
within countries, as discussed in Section 3. The factors behind the diminished
role of the stockbuilding cycle have therefore also made for reduced
41
34 Trade shares have increased in both the United States and European Union countries while
Japan is a notable exception (OECD, 1999a). It should also be noted that even though trade has
not contributed to reduced divergencies over time, there is no clear-cut answer to whether it has
become more or less important in cushioning the cycle across OECD countries. As noted in
Section 3, changes over time in the impact from trade differ substantially from country to country.international divergence. The greater cyclical stability of private consumption
over time, noted in Section 2, is also likely to be a factor behind declining
international divergencies. It is noticeable that many of the same trends seem
to be present and perhaps even a bit stronger in Europe (Box 3).
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2.5 Panel A. Output gap
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2.5 Panel C. Private consumption expenditure gap












2.5 Panel D. Stockbuilding
Figure 17. Domestic demand reducing cross-country divergencies
(Average standard deviation of gaps across countries)Box 3. The particular case of the euro area
While little evidence has been found that countries are increasingly in-phase,
this could have changed recently or might do so in the future. Indeed,
a number of factors can be identified that contribute directly to aligning the
business cycle across countries. Some of these factors are reviewed in what
follows, with the main focus on the role played by asset prices and their
tendency for co-movement across countries.
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In the context of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, a crucial question has been
how to deal with asymmetric developments in Member countries. As well, it has been
discussed whether the removal of barriers that create market segmentation would
stimulate synchronisation through greater market integration or reduce it through
greater specialisation. Evidence presented in OECD (1999b) suggests that, on balance,
the integration effect is the strongest.
Long time-series are available only for five euro-area countries (Austria, France,
Germany, Italy and Spain) but at least for these countries Figure 18 shows a clear
tendency for reduced divergencies of output over time. Indeed, the trend looks
somewhat stronger and less noisy than for the full country sample considered in the
main text and there are also indications that the reduced desynchronisation is linked to
the euro economies moving increasingly in phase, something that could not be found
for the full sample. The tendency for reduced divergence is driven principally by
stockbuilding and private consumption. In contrast to the full sample, the tendency for
investment to become less divergent is also more clear for the euro area.
Figure 18. Reduced divergencies among euro area countries
(Standard deviation of output gaps across countries)  
Note: The degree of synchronisation is measured by the standard deviation of the output gap at each
point in time across 5 euro countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Austria). The thick line
shows the 12 quarter moving average. The gap is calculated using an HP1600 filter. 














3.0As discussed in Section 3, balance sheets in the corporate and, particularly,
the household sector have tended to expand, with household net wealth also
rising over the past three decades. Furthermore, this process has been
associated with a greater weight for assets with market-determined prices. As
a result, net wealth positions have tended to become more sensitive to
movements in asset prices. For any given degree of cross-country correlation
in asset prices, this – by itself – has tended to increase synchronisation. The
evidence that wealth effects in private consumption have become stronger
over time is suggestive of a further increase in the influence of common
international movements in asset prices (but evidently also of national,
idiosyncratic asset price movements). Expanding corporate sector balance
sheets also imply that collateral and, hence, the availability of external
funding resources has become more sensitive to international movements in
asset prices.
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Perhaps more interesting are the signs that increased financial market
integration is leading to greater co-variation in asset prices across countries
and hence may be responsible for more synchronised domestic demand. One
indication that capital is now more mobile and financial markets hence more
integrated is the decreasing correlation of saving and investment across
countries, i.e. the tendency for the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle to fade (Figure
19). This tendency seems to be particularly marked among EU countries
where there has been very little correlation between saving and investment
over the past decade. Increased capital mobility should be associated with
more internationally diversified portfolios, which again should increase
covariation of returns. However, higher asset price correlations could also be
the result (rather than just the cause) of increasing synchronisation of real
economic developments across countries. For example, the move towards
fiscal consolidation and a regime of stable low inflation has taken place
across virtually all countries and is likely to have boosted bond yield
correlation. In practice, thus, causality is presumably bi-directional.
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35 There seems to have been no generalised tendency for bank balance sheets to expand
(relative to GDP) and it is therefore not clear that international asset price movements have gained
greater influence through stronger bank balance-sheet effects (OECD, 2000).Figure 19 . Declining correlation between saving and investment
(In per cent of GDP)  
1. The sample consists of 21 OECD countries: United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, United
Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
Government bond prices have been correlated across countries for some time,
but correlations have tended to rise in general and have become near-perfect
among euro-area countries (Figure 20). Furthermore, considering corporate
bond prices the evidence points to a high correlation in risk premia in recent





















































































































































































































































































































tyears, though insufficient data prevent an examination of whether this is the
result of an increase over time. The bottom-line is that bond yields have
become very highly correlated across countries, likely contributing to greater
synchronisation.
36
Figure  20. Ten-year government bond yields have become more correlated
Note: Average correlation coefficients are calculated as simple averages of bivariate correlation
coefficients between G7 countries (i.e. United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, United
Kingdom, and Canada). Bivariate correlations are calculated for each pair of G7 countries from
1973 to 2001:5 over 7 different time periods.
Sources: Datastream, OECD.
Equity prices have also tended to become more correlated. Figure 21 shows
that, on average across pairs of G7 countries, bilateral correlation coefficients
between one-month returns on broad market indices have risen over the
period since the early 1970s.
37 Indeed, cutting the period in half, every
bilateral correlation coefficient has increased. In terms of factors driving this
development, it is noticeable that the increase in average correlation has been
much more pronounced for the TMT (technology, media and telecom) sector
than for the broader indices. This is, in all likelihood, a case of common
technology shocks driving the co-movements of equity markets (Box 4).

































36 It might have been thought that an increased correlation of bond prices would have been
associated also with increased correlation of real house prices. However, the available evidence
does not point to any such increase.
37 The same picture emerges when, for a shorter period, considering a wider set of EU
countries.Figure 21. Stock market returns have become more correlated
Note: Monthly stock returns are calculated as log differences between end-of-month prices for the broad
market and TMT sector indices of the G7 countries; i.e. United States, Japan, Germany, France,
Italy, United Kingdom, and Canada. Bivariate correlation coefficients are then calculated for each
pair of the G7 countries’ stock returns from 1973 to 2001:5 in 5-year moving windows. Average
correlation coefficients are constructed as arithmetic averages of the estimated bivariate correlation
coefficients.
Sources: Datastream, OECD.
Box 4. Common technology shocks driving share prices?



















































There may be a number of causes behind increased share price correlations across
countries. Financial integration and reduced divergencies in macroeconomic policies
are examples with repercussions throughout the economies. Others relate to global
developments in individual sectors driving correlations. An example could be
technological change. In this case, increased cross-country correlations would be
driven by the sectors where such common technological change took place. Thus, the
news driving share price co-movements would tend to be industry-specific and
increased aggregate correlation across countries would be the result of increasingly
correlated news in some industries. In the alternative case of economy-wide
developments driving share price correlations, the news driving increased correlation
should be spread over all industries.
Conditional variances of share price returns may be considered a proxy indicator of
risk, which again is affected by the arrival of new information. Thus, if conditional
variances have become more highly correlated in some sectors but not in others, this
may suggest that the news driving share prices in the former sectors have had a more
global character, possibly as a result of common technological developments. To shed
light on this, time-varying conditional variances of equity returns have been estimated
for the G7 countries using a GARCH technique. Bilateral correlations of conditional




Basic industries 0.29 0.41
General industries 0.27 0.45
Cyclical consumer goods 0.21 0.21
Non-cyclical consumer goods 0.41 0.26
Cyclical services 0.38 0.41




Information technology -0.02 0.57
Total market 0.34 0.46
Of which: TMT sectors 0.07 0.61
1. For Resources, Cyclical and Non-cyclical consumer goods, Utilities and Information technology,
average figures are only for the countries for which the number of observations is more than at least
half of the full observation number during the sample period. However, two sub-periods (1988-2001
and 1995-2001), where most countries in the sample have the full time series, show trends similar to
those over the two periods reported.
2. For Utilities, France is not included, as data is only available from July 2000.
A further, much more speculative, channel for greater synchronisation is the
internationalisation of enterprises – over and above the effect it may have on
synchronisation of share prices as discussed in Box 4. For example, to the
extent enterprises are multinational, the need to retrench because of
48 Factors explaining reduced international divergencies
over all such country pairs. This has been done for two sub-periods since 1973 and for
a number of sectors (Table 3).
The results indicate an increased correlation of total market volatility (or risk) driven,
in particular, by the IT sector and more generally TMT shares (note that non-cyclical
services include the Telecom industry) as well as the financial sector. Given that major
technological breakthroughs, product developments and internationalisation have
taken place in the TMT and financial sectors (where considerable deregulation and
liberalisation has taken place since early and mid 1980s) it is perhaps not surprising
that the shocks affecting these industries transmit more globally. Also, in light of the
“new economy”, the results seem to be consistent with the hypothesis that common
technology shocks, spurred by rapid expansion of information and communication
technology, may have been the main driving force in concurrent asset price
developments across borders.developments in one market may cause cut-backs in activities in other
countries, and vice versa in case of buoyant conditions.
38 It is difficult to get
a picture of the potential importance of such effects. However, foreign direct
investment flows have expanded strongly in recent years pointing to
a potentially rising influence of this channel (Figure 22).
Figure 22. International investment has become more important
(in per cent of gross domestic product)
1. Germany, France, Italy and United Kingdom
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
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38 Conceivably, this may be the case even where no cross-border trade is concerned. By
contrast, where a downturn in one market affects activities elsewhere through trade linkages it
should not matter for the international propagation whether these trade linkages occur within
a firm or between different firms.
Assets
Direct investment abroad
Equity and debt securities
Liabilities
Direct investment in rep.economy
Equity and debt securities

















































































1980 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 2000The transmission of cyclical fluctuations over time may conceivably also be
affected by “soft” factors such as confidence. Even if more tangible
influences such as linkages via trade and asset prices may determine the
overall magnitude of international transmission, its timing could well be
influenced by confidence. Indeed, over the decade of the 1990s there has been
a very high correlation between indicators of business confidence and share
prices in many countries, notably the United States. Although causality
remains uncertain, this may conceivably have speeded up the impact of share
price developments by directly affecting the “animal spirits” of investors.
Nevertheless, despite closer correlation of equity returns over the last two
decades, it is not obvious that cross-country correlations of confidence
indicators have increased in any systematic manner.
50 Factors explaining reduced international divergencies5. Implications for policy of the changed cycle
As argued above, the tendency for the amplitude of national business cycles
to decline over time may be partly related to the greater emphasis on medium-
term oriented monetary and fiscal policies. The success of these policies in
achieving this outcome is a good reason for maintaining the overall
macroeconomic policy stance. However, within this overall orientation some
new challenges, principally to monetary policy, can be discerned. First,
monetary policy needs to be alert to tendencies for greater international
synchronisation of business cycles and the rising importance of non-trade
channels of international spillover. Second, the increased role for asset prices
in driving domestic economies makes it important to avoid misalignments of
these prices which subsequently may be painful to unwind. This points to the
role that prudential regulation and supervision has to play, in particular since
private savings imbalances can now accumulate on a larger scale than was
possible before. Third, the factors working to change the shape of the business
cycle and to strengthen international spillovers are also likely to influence the
monetary transmission mechanism. In what follows, the first theme will be
further developed by means of simulations with the Secretariat’s
INTERLINK model.
The simulation refers to an episode of economic downturn in the United
States (Figure 23). Concretely, it is assumed that the recovery projected in the
OECD Economic Outlook 69 from the second half of 2001 is delayed by two
semesters due to a further weakening of private consumption and investment.
At the same time it is assumed that doubts about the sustainability of the new
economy will lead to a drop in US share prices by 20 per cent. The Fed
responds to this weakness by cutting short-term interest by 200 basis points,
which is sufficient to bring inflation and output back towards baseline over
the medium term. Long-term US interest rates are assumed to be reduced by
half the cut in short rates. Three variants of the simulation are considered to
gauge the effect of the US slowdown on the euro area, where in all three cases
the ECB is assumed to ease interest rates sufficiently to bring inflation back
towards baseline over the medium term. In the first simulation, activity is
affected only through trade links, while European share prices remain
unchanged and bond yields respond only partly to the easing in ECB interest
rates. In the second simulation, European share prices move down to the same
extent as in the United States. The third simulation combines this with the
assumption that European bond yields are affected by their US counterparts.
51With limited knowledge of exchange rate determination, nominal exchange
rates have been assumed unchanged.
Figure 23. Effect of a US downturn on the euro area output gap transmitted
through different channels
Note: The Figure shows the adjustment of real GDP in the euro area to a US demand shock under three
different assumptions about the transmission mechanisms, cf. the main text. INTERLINK
simulation.
The assumptions adopted for these simulations are obviously rough-and-
ready but they nevertheless illustrate the potential importance of non-trade
linkages. With only the trade channel in operation, the required short-term
interest rate reduction in the euro-area peak at 125 basis points. As is the case
for the United States, long rates are assumed to be reduced by half this
amount. Output drops by a little more than 1/2 per cent before returning to its
baseline in 2004. Despite equity prices having smaller impacts on
consumption and investment in Europe than in the United States, the next
simulation shows that more monetary easing is needed when lower equity
prices spill over. Concretely, short rates are cut by 175 basis points in the euro
area (and the pass-through to long rates maintained at 1/2), but despite the
additional monetary easing, the peak reduction in output is now around 3/4 per
cent. The final simulation illustrates the importance of reactions in the long
rates: euro-area short rates are cut by 150 basis points, but since European
long rates now reacts to euro-area short rates as well US long rates, the
ensuing reduction in the euro-area long rates turns out to be similar to the
reduction in the short rates, i.e. 150 basis points. In this case, the output loss
is contained at around 0.6 per cent, i.e. an intermediate position compared
with the two former simulations.
52 Implications for policy of the changed cycle

















Per cent     Per cent
Baseline Trade only Trade and equity price long rate reductionThe upshot of these model simulations is that non-trade spillovers are
potentially powerful. Thus, monetary policy may need to react more
forcefully than in a situation where trade is the only cross-country
transmission channel. At the same time, however, asset prices – including not
only shares and bonds but also fixed property
39 – have become more
important for the monetary transmission mechanism through wealth and
balance-sheet effects. This might be an argument for a more gradual approach
to monetary policy given that the links between interest rates and asset prices
may be tenuous and unstable (as may the links between asset prices and
activity) (OECD, 2000). Being forceful and gradual at the same time is hard.
Arguably, though, the recent episode of monetary policy easing in the United
States may be seen as an example that involved moving interest rates a lot but
doing so in relatively small steps.
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39 Not to speak of exchange rates, whose effects are even more important, but whose
determination is unclear and therefore have been disregarded in this paper.6. Conclusion
There is strong evidence that business cycles have become smaller in most
OECD countries over the past two decades, mainly reflecting a reduced role
of stockbuilding and more stable private consumption. Trade acts to cushion
fluctuations in output, but despite the increased openness of OECD
economies, this effect has not generally become larger over time. The
persistence of the cycle is unchanged in the major regions but has increased
elsewhere. Divergencies of output gaps across OECD countries have
diminished since 1960 with a particularly strong tendency since the early
1990s. This mainly reflects the decreasing size of domestic gaps as opposed
to closer international alignment of cycles. However, synchronisation may
increase in the future, not least due to increased financial integration among
OECD countries.
Macroeconomic policies have exerted a stabilising influence over the past
two decades, pointing to the necessity of continuing – and potentially
strengthening – current frameworks. A main challenge for policy makers is
related to how to cope with increasing financial deepening in the private
sector and the ensuing vulnerability to changes in asset prices. This challenge
is reinforced by the increasing covariance of asset prices across countries.
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1. The Hodrick-Prescott filter
The HP filter extracts a stochastic trend (yt
HP), which for a given value of
λ moves smoothly over time and is uncorrelated with the cycle (Kydland and
Prescott, 1990). The trend is defined as the solution to the problem:
min ∑T
t=1 (yt – yt
HP)









λ is a smoothing parameter which penalises variation in the growth rate of the
trend. When λ approaches infinity, the trend is perfectly log linear. When
λ approaches zero, the trend collapses into the actual series. As noted by
Cogley and Nason (1995), the optimal value for lambda can be approximated
by (σ yHP /σ c )
2, where σ yHP is the standard deviation of the innovations to the
trend and σ c is the standard deviation of the innovations to the cycle.
However, no formal criteria have been developed to pick the optimal λ and
most studies use the value originally chosen by Kydland and Prescott, i.e.
λ =1600 for quarterly data. As pointed out by Canova (1998), this value of λ
leaves in cycles of an average duration of four to six years, corresponding
roughly to the length of an average US cycle as defined by the NBER.
However, while this value may be sensible from the point of view of
a business cycle researcher, the assumed magnitude has been challenged by
several studies. Nelson and Plosser (1982), for instance, estimated λ to be
close to 1 for most of the series they examined, implying that much of the
variability that the HP1600 filter attributes to the cyclical component is, in
fact, part of the trend. In other words, by choosing low values of λ , only high
frequency cycles are identified – cycles are perceived almost as white noise –
while cycles of longer duration will be perceived as part of the trend. On the
other hand, choosing a λ much higher than 1600 implies that cycles are
assumed to be “very long”. It follows that by applying various values of λ , the
HP filter is capable of mimicking quite closely the outcomes a range of other
detrending methods, among them the band-pass filter (frequency domain) and
first order differentiating. Interestingly, some studies find little or no
difference between the output-gap outcomes of applying different filtering
techniques (Christodoulakis et al., 1995). Others however, including
Bjørnland (2000) and Canova (1998), find more substantial differences,
57though it appears that these are mainly related to detrending of real wages,
working hours and productivity.
The HP filter has several attractions from a practical viewpoint, because it
optimally extracts the trend (Canova, 1998) and because it is additive. The
latter feature implies that it is easy to decompose contributions to movements
in detrended series by the variations in its (uncorrelated) components.
However, a number of studies, including Boone et al. (2001), also emphasise
some critical features about the HP filter:
● The HP filter suffers from the well-known end-point problem: as the filter
is symmetric it has a strong tendency to move the trend towards the actual
data towards the end of the sample.
● Determining the smoothing parameter (λ ) in extracting the trend, i.e. the
“penalty” for deviations of trend from actual values, is based more on
subjective judgement than on formal criteria.
● The HP filter implicitly assumes that the gap is white noise and that the
underlying series can be approximated by an I(2) process. This is
inconsistent with historical time series data as well as standard models of
the business cycle, which posit a high degree of first order autocorrelation
in the gap (a high degree of persistence). However, these inconsistencies
may not be as bad as they sound in practice – they are mostly related to the
end-point problem and for generating forecast for the underlying series
beyond the historical data.
● The HP filter, like other univariate filtering methods, ignores other
information than what is embodied in the specific time series being filtered.
This may result in biased estimates.
● The mechanical application of the HP filter to series which are either
integrated or driven by deterministic trends may induce spurious results
(Cogley and Nason, 1995). Hence, the HP method is essentially subject to
the critique by Nelson and Kang (1981), who showed that if data are
actually generated by a random walk, detrending will lead to the
identification of spurious cycles.
It is difficult to gauge the importance of these problems. The end-point
problem can be substantially mitigated in various ways, e.g. by extending the
sample with forecasts or artificial data. Moreover, by applying HP filters with
58 Annexvarious  λ ’s, it is possible to mimic a broader range of other filtering
techniques. In conclusion, the choice of a specific filtering method potentially
has a substantial impact on the resulting detrended levels of the time series
data and hence on the levels of the output gaps and their standard deviations.
However, when comparing business cycle behaviour over time and across
countries, as is the case in this study, this is not too large a concern since the
focus is on the change in the variability of gaps as well as the relative
variability across countries. In other words, assuming that the bias implied by
a certain filter does not change too much over time or across countries, the
outcomes are likely to be fairly robust to the choice of filtering approach.
2. A brief survey of the business cycle literature
Box A1 below summarises methodologies and main findings of a number of
recent business cycle and detrending studies.
3. Measuring inflation expectations from relative variances of inflation
and the output gap
It is difficult to accurately measure the change in inflation expectations, but
in the context of this exercise, an indication can be given by the variability of
inflation relative to that of the output gap. Areduction in this ratio may imply
that inflation expectations have become more firmly anchored (cf. Figure 16
of the main text). This can be seen relatively easily from cases a) and b)
below:
Case a) Assume that private sector inflation expectations are anchored
around a constant, B:
π (t)= B + a*gap(t), where π is inflation and gap is the output gap.
Then we have that:
var(π (t)) = a
2*var(gap(t))
=> var(π (t))/ var(gap(t)) = a
2 [1]
Case b) Assume instead that private sector inflation expectations are
backward-looking:
π (t)= π (t–1) + a*gap(t). Then we have that:
Annex 59var(π (t)) = a
2*[var(gap(t))+var(gap(t–1))+.....+var(gap(t–n))] +
+ n*cov[gap(t), gap(t–1)...gap(t–n)]




=> var(π (t))/var(gap(t)) > a
2 [2]
Note that (2) only holds if the covariance between lagged gaps is not negative
and numerically large (which is rather unlikely).
60 AnnexTable A1. Contributions to the variance of output gaps
Note: The variance of the output gaps is a proxy for the average size of the gap (since it measures the
squared average distance from the gap mean, which is close to zero). The contributions to total
output gap variance from the total domestic demand gap and the trade gap are calculated as
a weighted average of their individual variances and their covariance. The residual is the
discrepancy between the total output variance and the sum of its components, which is due to
statistical discrepancies, averaging effects as well as the non-additivity of real expenditure
components for countries using chain-weighted accounts. The gross contribution from trade
denotes the isolated impact on output gap variance from the variance of export- and import gaps.
The covariance effect is mainly related to the strong positive covariance between the total domestic
demand gap and the import gap, but includes also the covariance between the total domestic
demand gap and the export gap as well as between the export gap and the import gap. Australia,
Norway and New Zealand are not included due to lack of adequate data.
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Contribution from Memorandum Memorandum
Country and  Total output total domestic Contribution item: gross item: gross
period gap variance demand from trade Residual contribution contribution
from trade from covariance
(1)=(2)+(3)+(4) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Austria
1961-1970 2.2 3.0 -0.8 -0.1 0.8 -1.5
1971-1980 3.5 6.0 -2.4 -0.1 2.7 -5.1
1981-1990 0.8 1.2 -0.3 -0.1 2.4 -2.7
1991-2000 0.9 0.7 0.5 -0.3 2.9 -2.4
Canada
1961-1970 1.3 1.4 -0.7 0.6 0.4 -1.1
1971-1980 1.4 1.3 -0.3 0.3 1.2 -1.5
1981-1990 4.3 6.0 -2.7 1.0 2.7 -5.4
1991-2000 1.5 1.8 -0.3 -0.0 1.7 -1.9
France
1961-1970 1.4 3.7 -0.5 -1.9 0.4 -0.8
1971-1980 1.3 2.1 -0.6 -0.0 0.6 -1.4
1981-1990 0.9 1.4 -0.5 -0.1 0.4 -0.9
1991-2000 0.7 1.2 -0.4 -0.0 1.0 -1.3
Germany
1961-1970 2.6 2.3 -0.8 1.1 0.6 -1.4
1971-1980 2.9 4.6 -1.5 -0.1 0.9 -2.4
1981-1990 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.1 -1.1
1991-2000 1.5 1.4 0.0 0.1 2.1 -2.1
Italy
1961-1970 2.6 4.4 -2.0 0.1 0.6 -2.6
1971-1980 4.4 7.2 -2.7 -0.1 1.3 -4.0
1981-1990 0.8 1.2 -0.4 0.0 0.8 -1.2
1991-2000 0.7 3.1 -2.5 0.1 2.0 -4.5
Japan
1961-1970 2.9 2.7 -0.4 0.5 0.1 -0.5
1971-1980 3.3 5.2 -1.8 -0.1 0.3 -2.1
1981-1990 1.1 1.5 -0.3 -0.0 0.2 -0.6
1991-2000 1.8 2.2 -0.4 -0.0 0.3 -0.7
Spain
1961-1970 1.5 2.0 -0.5 0.1 0.2 -0.8
1971-1980 1.7 2.8 -1.1 0.1 0.5 -1.6
1981-1990 1.0 2.9 -1.8 -0.1 0.5 -2.3
1991-2000 1.3 3.6 -2.6 0.2 1.1 -3.7
Sweden
1961-1970 3.0 4.0 -0.8 -0.1 1.1 -1.9
1971-1980 2.4 5.3 -2.6 -0.2 3.5 -6.1
1981-1990 1.5 3.3 -2.0 0.2 1.7 -3.7
1991-2000 2.5 3.2 -0.9 0.2 3.6 -4.5
United Kingdom
1961-1970 1.4 2.0 -0.7 0.0 0.4 -1.1
1971-1980 4.5 5.2 -1.1 0.4 1.6 -2.7
1981-1990 2.5 4.9 -2.3 -0.1 1.2 -3.5
1991-2000 1.1 1.5 -0.4 0.0 0.8 -1.2
United States
1961-1970 1.8 2.1 -0.2 -0.0 0.1 -0.3
1971-1980 4.6 6.7 -1.6 -0.5 0.3 -1.9
1981-1990 3.1 4.2 -1.0 -0.1 0.3 -1.3

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Figure A1. Amplitude of output gaps, country specific details
Panel A. Standard deviation of output gaps
Note: Moving 10-year windows. The gap is calculated using an HP1600 filter.
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Spain Sweden Norway New ZealandFigure A1 (cont.). Amplitude of output gaps, country specific details
Panel B. Average absolute size of output gaps
Note: Moving 10-year windows. The gap is calculated using an HP1600 filter.
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Spain Sweden Norway New ZealandFigure A2. Standard deviation of gaps 
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3.0 United States Japan Euro(1) Other countries(2)
Private consumption expenditure














3.0 United States Japan Euro(1) Other countries(2)
Government consumption expenditureFigure A2 (cont.). Standard deviation of gaps
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United States Japan Euro(1) Other countries(2)Figure A2 (cont.). Standard deviation of gaps
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Net export of goods and services (% of GDP)
United States Japan Euro(1) Other countries(2)
United States Japan Euro(1) Other countries(2)
United States Japan Euro(1) Other countries(2)Figure A2 (cont.). Standard deviation of gaps
Note: Moving 10-year windows. The gap is calculated using an HP1600 filter.
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Private non-residential fixed capital formation























Private residential fixed capital formation
United States Japan Euro(1) Other countries(2)
United States Japan Euro(1) Other countries(2)Figure A3. Persistence of output gaps
Note: Moving 10-year windows. The gap is calculated using an HP1600 filter.
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